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JUDICIAL JURISDICTION AND CHOICE OF
LAW IN INTERSTATE ACCIDENT CASES:
THE IMPLICATIONS OF
SHAFFER .HEITNER
ROBERT ALLEN SEDLER*
The doctrinal and pragmatic relationships between judicial jurisdic-
tion and choice of law are most evident in interstate accident cases.'
The essence of the doctrinal relationship is that when jurisdiction over
an interstate accident case is constitutionally exercised pursuant to a
tort long-arm statute, the forum may also constitutionally apply its sub-
stantive law. The "minimum contacts"' between the transaction and
the forum that are constitutionally sufficient for the exercise of long-
arm jurisdiction over a suit arising from the accident also are constitu-
tionally sufficient for the forum to apply its substantive law.' For ex-
ample, if a state can constitutionally assert jurisdiction over a foreign
manufacturer, whose products have caused injury within the state, it
can constitutionally apply its standard of liability to the manufacturer.4
The pragmatic relationship between judicial jurisdiction and choice
of law in interstate accident cases is perhaps more significant than the
doctrinal relationship. When the plaintiff is domiciled in a recovery
state and the defendant is domiciled in a nonrecovery state, each state
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University. B.A., 1956, University of Pittsburgh; J.D.,
1959, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
1. See generally Sedler, Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: The Consequences of Shaf-
fer v. Heitner, 63 IowA L. REv. 1031 (1978).
2. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
3. A state may constitutionally apply its law when it has an interest in doing so and the
application is not fundamentally unfair to either party, Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179
(1964), or when it has legally significant factual contacts with the transaction. Carroll v. Lanza,
349 U.S. 408 (1955). For a discussion of the present status of constitutional limitations on choice of
law, see generally R. CRAMTON & R. SEDLER, THE SUM AND SUBSTANCE OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §
13.1000 (1977).
4. See, e.g., Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 113 (1969). There are few modem cases involving choice of law in products liability because
once the forum has asserted jurisdiction under its long-arm statute the application of its law is
foreordained. The choice of law question is, in effect, subsumed in the determination of the juris-
dictional question.
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has a real interest in applying its law 5 regardless of the locus of the
accident. The social and economic consequences of the accident will be
felt by the parties and the insurer in the parties' home state.6 Although
some commentators maintain that the forum should not necessarily ap-
ply its own law in this situation,' most policy-oriented courts do so.8
When a plaintiff sues in the defendant's home state, the court applies
the law of the forum to protect the resident defendant and insurer.9 In
some cases, however, plaintiffs have been able to sue in their home
states, with the courts usually applying the law of the forum to allow
recovery. 10
The decision in Shaffer v. Heitner" will have an important impact
on the law of judicial jurisdiction. The essential thrust of Shaffer is that
the minimum contacts and fundamental fairness test'2 applies to any
exercise of jurisdiction, rendering violative of due process the exercise
of jurisdiction over an unrelated personal claim on the basis of the fo-
rum's physical power over the defendant's property. 3 And, although
Shaffer did not expressly state that a court can not exercise jurisdiction
when it is based solely on personal service in the forum, 14 this conclu-
sion seems to follow.' 5
5. See Sedler, The Governmental Interest Approach to Choice of Law: An Analysls and a
Reformulation, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 181, 222-27 (1977).
6. Id at 228.
7. See the listing of methodologies that include the means for the resolution of true
conflicts except through the application of the forum's own law. Id at 217-18.
8. The term "policy-oriented courts" refers to courts that have abandoned the traditional
approach. In practice, all such courts, regardless of the methodology they are purportedly apply-
ing, resolve torts conflicts cases by giving primary consideration to the policies and interests of the
states involved. See Sedler, Rules of Choice ofLaw Versus Choice of Law Rules.- Judicial Method in
Conflicts Torts Cases, 44 TENN. L. Rv. 975, 975-83 (1977).
9. See, e.g., Satchwill v. Vollrath Co., 293 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Wis. 1968); Maguire v. Exeter
& Hampton Elec. Co., 114 N.H. 589, 325 A.2d 778 (1974).
10. See Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973); Foster
v. Leggett, 484 S.W. 2d 827 (Ky. 1972); Schwartz v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 300 Minn.
487, 221 N.W.2d 665 (1974).
11. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
12. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
13. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). See generally Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of
Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956).
14. The Court declined to reexamine the facts of previously decided cases to determine
whether jurisdiction could have been sustained under the Shaffer standards, but stated that to the
extent these cases were inconsistent with the newstandards they were overruled. 433 U.S. at 212 n.
39.
15. Personal service on the defendant in the forum, without more, would not give rise to
either forum-defendant or forum-litigation contacts as defined in Shaffer. See Kulko v. Superior
Court, 98 S.Ct. 1690 (1978).
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While Shaffer will not affect the doctrinal relationship between juris-
diction and choice of law in interstate accident cases, 6 it will have an
important effect on the pragmatic relationship. It redefines and limits
the circumstances in which a state court may exercise jurisdiction over
a nonresident defendant. As Professor Vernon notes, Shaffer requires
forum-defendant and forum-litigation contacts.17 If an accident involv-
ing a recovery state plaintiff and a nonrecovery state defendant occurs
in the plaintiff's home state, the requirement of forum-litigation con-
tacts is satisfied. The plaintiff can bring suit there, under the tort long-
arm statute,18 and the forum will apply its law.' 9 If an accident occurs
in the defendant's home state, however, the forum's long-arm statute
may not be applicable. 20 Prior to Shaffer, there were a number of as-
sumedly constitutional ways that a plaintiff, injured in an out-of-state
accident, could obtain the jurisdiction of the courts of the home state.
This commentary considers the effect of Shaffer on these jurisdictional
bases.
When jurisdiction could be exercised solely on the basis of personal
service on the defendant in the forum, the parties, if so inclined, could
collusively arrange for service on the nominal defendant in the
plaintiff's home state. In Cioolla v. Shaposka,2 I the defendant, a Dela-
ware resident, was served with process in Pennsylvania while he and
the plaintiff, a Pennsylvania resident, were playing golf together.22
Ironically, the service was for naught because the Pennsylvania court
applied Delaware law to deny recovery. Other courts, however, have
applied forum law in order to allow recovery.24 The abandonment of
16. See Sedler, supra note 1, at 1035-36.
17. See Vernon, Single-Factor Bases of In Personam Jurisdiction--A Speculation on the Im-
pact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 273; Vernon, State-Court Jurisdiction: A Prelimi-
nary Inquiry into the Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 63 IowA L. REv. 997 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
A Preliminary Inquiry].
18. See, e.g., CAL. Cwy. PRoc. CODE § 410.10 (Deering 1977); N.Y. Ctv. PRAc. LAW §
302(a)(2) (McKinney 1972).
19. See, e.g., Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215,
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976).
20. Since Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d
761 (1961), these statutes generally have been construed as applicable whenever the harm occurs
in the forum, even wben the act producing the harm occurs elsewhere.
21. 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970).
22. See Sedler, The Territorial Imperative Automobile Accidents and the Significance of a
State Line, 9 DUQ. L. REv. 394, 401 (1971).
23. See id at 395-402.
24. See, e.g., Bennett v. Macy, 324 F. Supp. 409 (W.D. Ky. 1971); Foster v. Leggett, 484
S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972); Schneider v. Nichols, 280 Minn. 139, 158 N.W.2d 254 (1968).
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the power theory of jurisdiction in Shaffer presumably renders uncon-
stitutional the exercise of jurisdiction based solely on personal service
in the forum.
In Foster v. Leggett,25 the nominal defendant, although domiciled
on the Ohio side of a Kentucky/Ohio functional socio-economic and
mobility area,26 was employed on the Kentucky side and rented a room
there two nights per week. An automobile accident occurred in Ohio
which resulted in the death of the passenger, a Kentucky resident. The
trip began in Kentucky and was to terminate there. Decedent's estate
brought suit in Kentucky which, unlike Ohio, does not recognize guest-
host immunity. The Kentucky court asserted jurisdiction on the basis of
personal service in the forum, and applied its own law to allow
recovery.
Prior to Shaffer, when jurisdiction could be exercised solely on the
basis of personal service in the forum, it was unnecessary to consider
whether a defendant, who was brought before a court on this basis, had
any other contacts with the forum state. Shaffer makes this a necessary
consideration. If a case similar to Foster were to arise, Kentucky could
probably still exercise jurisdiction based on the International Shoe Co.
v. Washington27 test because the defendant had sufficient minimum
contacts with the forum state. It is consistent with the forum-defendant
contacts aspect of Shaffer to subject a person to jurisdiction in a state
where he resides part-time--even though not domiciled there-and
engages in such regular activities as employment. This is comparable to
the exercise of jurisdiction over nonforum related claims against a for-
eign corporation or nonresident individual engaging in substantial
business activity within the forum.28 The plaintiff may be able to bring
suit in the home state notwithstanding that the accident occurred in the
defendant's home state.29 The forum may then apply its law allowing
recovery, 30 assuming this would not be fundamentally unfair to the
25. 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972).
26. See Sedler, supra note 22, at 399.
27. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
28. See, eg., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Budde v. Kenteow
Hawaii, Ltd., 565 F.2d 1145 (10th Cir. 1977); Bernardi Bros., Inc. v. Pride Mfg., Inc. 427 F.2d 297
(3d Cir. 1970).
29. See, ag., Beja v. Jahangiri, 453 F.2d 959 (2d Cir. 1971). When a recovery state plaintiff is
injured by a nonrecovery state defendant in a nonrecovery state, suit may be brought in the state
of injury under its long-arm statute and that state is likely to allow recovery. Cf Conklin v.
Homer, 38 Wis.2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968) (Illinois guest statute not applied when accident
occurred in Wisconsin which was also the forum).
30. See, e.g., Meyer v. Chicago, Rock Island P.R.R., 508 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1975); Schwartz
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defendant."'
In Foster, the transaction giving rise to the injury also had substan-
tial factual connections with Kentucky; the trip originated and was to
terminate there. This satisfied the forum-litigation contacts aspect of
Shaffer, and thus made reasonable the use of a long-arm statute to
exercise jurisdiction over an accident which occurred elsewhere.3 2 In
Covolla,33 the trip originated in Delaware but would have terminated
in Pennsylvania had it not been aborted by the accident. This arguably
would have been sufficient, in itself, to allow Pennsylvania to apply its
long-arm statute because the transaction contemplated its consumma-
tion in the forum and application of the statute would have been
proper had the parties reached the state line.34 It is unclear whether
courts will interpret existing long-arm statutes to authorize the exercise
of jurisdiction on this basis but, if they are so interpreted or amended,
the exercise of such jurisdiction is constitutional.3 5
In Rosenthal v. Warren,36 the Second Circuit, in a diversity case, up-
held the exercise of jurisdiction over a physician even though there
were neither forum-defendant nor forum-litigation contacts with re-
gard to him. A New York resident had died on the operating table in a
Massachusetts hospital allegedly because of the negligence of a Massa-
chusetts physician and the hospital. The physician did not practice in
New York and nothing connected with the fatality occurred there.37
The court exercised jurisdiction by attaching the obligation of the mal-
practice insurer, which did business in New York, to defend the suit
v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 300 Minn. 487, 221 N.W.2d 665 (1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
959 (1976).
31. See Sedler, supra note 5, at 228-30.
32. Bennett v. Macy, 324 F. Supp. 409 (W.D. Ky. 1971); Schneider v. Nichols, 280 Minn.
139, 158 N.W.2d 254 (1968). See Cornelison v. Chancy, 16 Cal. 3d 143, 545 P.2d 264, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 352 (1976).
33. Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970). See notes 21-23 supra and accom-
panying text.
34. Professor Weintraub, who does not share my view that factual contacts between the fo-
rum and the accident are completely irrelevant for choice of law purposes, agrees that in this
situation Pennsylvania law should apply. R. WErrTrauB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS 248-49 (1971).
35. This problem is avoided if the long-arm statute is construed as authorizing the exercise
of jurisdiction within constitutional limits. See Savchuk v. Rush, - Minn. -, 245 N.W.2d 624,
628 (1976), vacated, 433 U.S. 903 (1977).
36. 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973).
37. The court obtained jurisdiction over the hospital by personal service on an agent who
was soliciting funds in New York. Presumably, this would not constitute sufficient activity in New
York to satisfy the forum-defendant contacts requirement of Shaffer. See note 15 supra.
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and indemnify the defendant. This jurisdictional base was in accord
with the procedures authorized by the New York Court of Appeals in
Seider v. Roth.38
Massachusetts law limited the amount of recovery for wrongful
death;39 New York law did not.4" The Second Circuit applied an inter-
est and fairness test of choice of law and held that New York law ap-
plied. New York had a real interest in applying its law, and its
application was neither unfair to the physician nor the insurer. The
physician could not be held liable beyond the policy limits, and, be-
cause the policy did not distinguish between liability for personal in-
jury and for wrongful death, the insurer reasonably could have
foreseen being held liable in excess of the Massachusetts wrongful
death limitation.4'
If a case similar to Warren were to arise after Shaffer, could New
York constitutionally exercise jurisdiction? Professor Vernon notes that
Seider has an "in rem genesis," and was based on a forum-plaintiff
nexus, whereas Shaffer requires a forum-defendant or forum-litigation
nexus.42 When so viewed, the exercise of Seider jurisdiction is uncon-
stitutional because the fictitious presence of the insurer's obligation to
defend and indemnify in the forum does not constitute contact with the
defendant or the litigation. Two lower New York state courts have so
held.43 Nevertheless, the Second Circuit has interpreted Seider jurisdic-
tion to be the equivalent of a judicially created direct action statute, 44
and, on this basis, has upheld the constitutionality of Seider jurisdic-
38. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
Section 47 of the Surrogate's Court Act provided that, for the purpose of conferring
jurisdiction upon a Surrogate's Court, 'a debt owing to decedent by a resident of the
state' is regarded as personal property .... [W]ithin the broad meaning of section 47
this liability insurance policy, even though no judgment had been obtained against the
insured, made decedent's estate a 'creditor' and the insurer a 'debtor' sufficient for the
purposes of the statute.
Id at 114, 216 N.E.2d at 314, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 102.
39. 7a MAss. ANN. LAws. ch. 229, § 92 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1971).
40. N.Y. EsT., PowERs & TRusTs LAW § 5-41 (McKinney 1967).
41. 475 F.2d at 441-46. Despite the absence of factual contacts with a transaction, a state
may constitutionally apply its law, provided the interest and fairness test is satisfied. See Sedler,
supra note 22, at 402-04.
42. See A Preliminary Inquiry, supra note 17, at 10 17-20.
43. Katz v. Umansky, 92 Misc.2d 285, 399 N.Y.S.2d 412 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Kennedy v. Der-
oker, 91 Misc. 2d 648, 398 N.Y.S.2d 628 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
44. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir.), cer. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969). Pro-
fessor Vernon asserts that Seider cannot properly be interpreted as equivalent to a direct action
statute because of its "in rem genesis." A Preliminary Inquiry, supra note 17, at 1018.
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tion after Shaffer.45
Ten days before the Supreme Court decided Shaffer, the New York
Court of Appeals, in Donawitz v. Danek,46 held that Seider jurisdiction
should not be exercised when a nonresident plaintiff brings suit. The
court, however, recognized that Seider "in effect established by judicial
fiat, a 'direct action' against the insurer."'' It then asserted that because
the New York legislature had not taken any action in response to
Seider, "it must be concluded that they are satisfied with it."
4 8
If Seider is interpreted as equivalent to a judicially created direct
action statute,49 the critical issue is whether, after Shaffer, a state can
constitutionally require an insurer engaged in substantial in-state busi-
ness activity50 to defend suits brought in the forum against one of its
insureds by a resident plaintiff who suffers injury in another forum. My
contention is that not only can a state constitutionally require the in-
surer to defend such actions but it can also apply its substantive law.
On the basis of this fusion of jurisdiction and choice of law, the remain-
der of this commentary distinguishes the exercise of such jurisdiction in
suits brought in the forum by residents and nonresidents." Because
Donawitz preceded Shaffer, it is unclear whether New York still would
exercise such jurisdiction or apply its law in a suit arising from an acci-
dent occurring in the defendant's home state and involving a resident
plaintiff and a nonrecovery state defendant.52 I will therefore develop
my thesis using Minnesota as the forum state.
45. O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 437 F. Supp. 994 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 579 F.2d
194 (2d Cir. 1978).
46. 42 N.Y.2d 138, 366 N.E.2d 253, 397 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1977).
47. d at 142, 366 N.E.2d at 255, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
48. Id
49. I do not consider the question whether the New York court can properly interpret the
statute on which the exercise of Seider jurisdiction is based without regard to its "in rem genesis."
Nevertheless, a coart can judicially create a "borrowing statute" by looking to the shorter limita-
tions period of the state whose substantive law it is applying. See Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63
N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973). It should then be able to create the equivalent of a direct action
statute by holding that the insurance company is the real party in interest and allowing suit to be
brought against it. In Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So.2d 713 (Fla. 1969), the Florida Supreme Court
did this when the named insured was before the court; the legislature, however, has substantially
restricted the circumstances in which the insurer could be joined. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.7262
(West Supp. 1978).
50. Many casualty insurance companies are national in scope, engaging in substantial busi-
ness activity in most states.
51. See note 63 infra and accompanying text.
52. See generally Neumeier v. Kuelner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64
(1972); Sedler, supra note 8, at 983-94.
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Minnesota statutorily authorizes the exercise of Seider jurisdiction,53
albeit on a quasi in rem basis, on behalf of resident plaintiffs. The Min-
nesota Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute in
Savchuk v. Rush,54 noting that the nonresident insured could not be
held liable beyond the policy limits and that it was applicable only
when the plaintiff was a resident of the forum.5- Further, Minnesota
will apply its substantive law allowing recovery whenever a resident
plaintiff is injured by a nonrecovery state defendant in a nonrecovery
state.5 6
The following hypothetical illustrates the constitutionality of the
Minnesota statute: A Minnesota resident is injured in Illinois while
riding as a guest in an automobile owned and operated by an Illinois
resident. The trip began in Illinois and was to terminate there. Illinois
has a guest statute;57 Minnesota does not. The driver's insurer writes
policies nationally and engages in substantial business activity in
Minnesota.
Minnesota can--consistent with due process-allow the plaintiff to
sue the insurer in Minnesota and apply its own law on the guest-host
immunity issue. The core concept of due process, both for jurisdictional
and choice of law purposes, is reasonableness and fairness. Minnesota
is providing a forum for its residents injured elsewhere by a party in-
sured by a company doing business in Minnesota." Practically, the suit
is between a resident and a liability insurer59 who has "purposefully
avail [ed itself] of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
53. MiNr. STAT. § 571.41(2) (1969).
54. - Minn. -, 245 N.W.2d 624 (1976), vacated, 433 U.S. 903 (1977).
55. Notice was given to the nonresident insured, and, consistent with Seider procedures, the
insured could appear without incurring liability beyond the policy limits. Id at -, 245 N.W.2d at
628-29.
56. Schwartz v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 300 Minn. 487, 221 N.W.2d 665 (1974),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976).
57. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, § 10.201 (Smith-Hurd 1971).
58. The Minnesota Supreme Court can interpret the statute to free it of its "in rem genesis."
The legislature intended to provide a Minnesota forum for residents injured elsewhere by a person
insured by a company doing business in Minnesota. It utilized a doctrinal approach that was
assumed to be constitutional prior to Shaffer. Now that this approach is unconstitutional, the
intention of the legislature can be effectuated by reinterpreting the statute as a direct action statute
limited to the insurer. The United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded Savchuk for
reconsideration in light of Shaffer. 433 U.S. 903 (1977).
59. Because the suit against the insurer is based on the actions of the insured, due process
would still probably require that the insured be given notice of the suit and the opportunity to
appear.
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State ... .,,60 It is also reasonable to apply the Minnesota guest-host
immunity statute because the economic and social consequences of the
accident will be felt there.6' Finally, the choice of law is fair to the
insurer; it in no sense relied on the Illinois guest statute, and its
rates-which are based on the loss experience of many insureds-are
affected only peripherally, if at all, by the tort law of any particular
state.62
Minnesota, by statute, is permitting its residents to accomplish di-
rectly, what the New York courts allow its residents to accomplish indi-
rectly through the exercise of Seider jurisdiction. The Minnesota
approach is preferable because it eliminates the insured, usually merely
a nominal defendant, and instead treats the insurer as the real party in
interest.
If, in the hypothetical, the plaintiff was an Illinois resident, there still
would not appear to be a constitutional objection to the exercise of ju-
risdiction because the forum-defendant contacts of the insurer with
Minnesota remain sufficient even after Shaffer. Minnesota, however,
could not constitutionally apply its own law in the absence of any fac-
tual contacts with the accident or a real interest in the outcome of the
resulting litigation. Because the only factual connections are the forum-
defendant contacts of the insurer, and the forum has no real interest in
the outcome of litigation between an Illinois resident and a national
insurer, application of Minnesota law would violate the due process
rights of the insurer.63
With the exception of Minnesota and New York, jurisdiction in cases
60. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 216 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254
(1957)).
The insurer is analogous to a foreign corporation doing business in a state. Such a corporation
may be required to defend nonforum-related claims because of its connections with the state. For
the view that jurisdiction over the insurer can be exercised on this basis after Shaffer, see Leathers,
Substantive Due Process Controls of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction, 66 KY. L.J. 1, 32-33 (1977).
61. In Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954), the Court sustained the
constitutionality of Louisiana's direct action statute as applied to a suit against an insurance com-
pany doing business in Louisiana on a claim arising from an accident in Louisiana involving a
nonresident insured. The Court emphasized Louisiana's interest in providing a forum for the in-
jured resident because the social and economic consequences of the accident would be felt there.
Id. at 72-73. This interest is the same when an accident occurs in another state because the social
and economic consequences of the accident will still be felt in the forum. See Minichiello v. Ro-
senberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 344 (1969).
62. Professor Weintraub has reminded us that "to talk of 'surprising' the insurer is very
likely to be talking nonsense." R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 34, at 206.
63. See generally Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 812 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396
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similar to the original hypothetical is generally unavailable. New
Hampshire exercises jurisdiction in automobile accident cases-but
only where the driver is a resident of New York-apparently on a "do
unto others" theory.' Only Louisiana,65 Wisconsin,66 and Puerto
Rico 67 have complete action statutes; and both the Louisiana and Wis-
consin statutes expressly provide that the insurer can be sued only if the
policy was issued or delivered in the state or the accident occurred
there.68 These statutes, therefore, constitute functionally restrictive sub-
U.S. 840 (1969) (Seider jurisdiction should not be exercised in favor of nonresidents, in principal
part because of its view that extension of Seider to nonresidents would be unconstitutional).
64. See Robitaille v. Orciuch, 382 F. Supp. 977 (D.N.H. 1974); Forbes v. Boynton, 113 N.H.
617, 313 A.2d 129 (1973).
65. LA. REV. STAT. § 22.655 (West Supp. 1978) provides:
The injured person or his or her survivors or heirs. . . , at their option shall have a
right of direct action against the insurer within the terms and limits of the policy....
This right of direct action shall exist whether the policy of insurance sued upon was
written or delivered in the State of Louisiana or not and whether or not such policy
contains a provision forbidding such direct action, provided the accident or injury oc-
curred within the State of Louisiana.
66. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 803.04(2)(a) (West 1977) provides:
In any action for damages caused by negligence, any insurer which has an interest in
the outcome of such controversy adverse to the plaintiff or any of the parties to such
controversy, or which by its policy of insurance assumes or reserves the right to control
the prosecution, defense or settlement of the claim or action, or which by its policy agrees
to prosecute or defend the action brought by plaintiff or any of the parties to such action,
or agrees to engage counsel to prosecute or defend said action or agrees to pay the costs
of such litigation, is by this section made a proper party defendant in any action brought
by plaintiff in this state on account of any claim against the insured. If the policy of
insurance was issued or delivered outside this state, the insurer is by this paragraph made
a proper party defendant only if the accident, injury or negligence occurred in this state.
67. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 26, §§ 2001, 2003 (1958 & Supp. 1975). Section 2001 provides:
The insurer issuing a policy insuring any person against loss or damage through legal
liability for the bodily injury, death, or damage to property of a third person, shall be-
come absolutely liable whenever a loss covered by the policy occurs, and payment of
such loss by the insurer to the extent of its liability therefore under the policy shall not
depend upon payment by the insured of or upon any final judgment against him arising
out of such occurrence.
Section 2003 provides:
Any individual sustaining damages and losses shall have, at his option, a direct action
against the insurer under the terms and limitations of the policy, which action he may
exercise against the insurer only or against the insurer and the insured jointly. The direct
action against the insurer may only be exercised in Puerto Rico. The liability of the
insurer shall not exceed that provided for in the policy, and the court shall determine,
not only the liability of the insurer, but also the amount of the loss. Any action brought
under this section shall be subject to the conditions of the policy or contract and to the
defenses that may be pleaded by the insurer to the direct action instituted by the insured.
68. See notes 65-66 supra.
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stantive rules,69 inapplicable to out-of-state accidents involving out-of-
state insured defendants. The Louisiana and Wisconsin courts would
not have the power to authorize a direct action against the insurer.s0
Some courts have expressly rejected Seider jurisdiction,71 although
this is inconsistent with the interest analysis approach to choice of law
that most policy-oriented courts follow. Their reluctance to exercise
Seider jurisdiction may be explained by a failure to fully recognize the
relationship between jurisdiction and choice of law. If the forum's sub-
stantive tort law favors recovery, sound policy considerations dictate
that its jurisdictional law should maximize the circumstances in which
forum residents can constitutionally obtain the benefit of that law.
Courts and legislatures can accomplish this by permitting a direct ac-
tion against an insurer doing business in the forum whenever an in-
sured is involved in an accident with a forum resident in another state.
Shaffer may stimulate a reanalysis of the relationship between judicial
jurisdiction and choice of law. Recognition of this relationship in inter-
state accident cases may lead to the adoption of this policy.
As this commentary went to press, both New York and Minnesota affirmed
the constitutionality-in light of Shaffer--of the exercise of Seider
jurisdiction.72
69. See Sedler, Functionally Restrictive Substantive Rules in American Conflicts Law, 50 So.
CAL. L. REv. 27, 44-50 (1976).
70. See Esteve v. Allstate Ins. Co., 351 So.2d 117 (La. 1977). But see Kirchen v. Orth, 390 F.
Supp. 313 (E.D. Wis. 1975). The Puerto Rico statute expressly authorizes suit against the insurer
when an accident occurs in another state involving a nonresident insured and a resident plaintiff,
P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 26, § 2003 (1958 & Supp. 1975), therefore the courts would have the power to
authorize such suits.
71. See, e.g., Robinson v. Shearer & Sons, Inc., 429 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1970); Ricker v. LaJoie,
314 F. Supp. 401 (D. Vt. 1970); Kirchman v. Mikula, 258 So.2d 701 (La. App. 1972); Missouri ex
rel. Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Lasky, 454 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. App. 1970); Johnson v.
Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 499 P.2d 1387 (Okla. 1972); Jardine v. Donnelly, 413 Pa. 474, 198
A.2d 513 (1964) (per curiam); De Rentiis v. Lewis, 106 R.I. 240, 258 A.2d 464 (1969); Howard v.
Allen, 254 S.C. 455, 176 S.E.2d 127 (1970); Housely v. Anaconda Co., 19 Utah 2d 124, 417 P.2d
390 (1967); Werner v. Werner, 84 Wash.2d 360, 526 P.2d 370 (1974).
72. Savchuk v. Rush, 47 U.S.L.W. 2290 (Minn. Oct. 20, 1978); Baden v. Staples, 47 U.S.L.W.
2291 (N.Y. Oct. 24, 1978).
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